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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20020376-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEIL 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for theft by deception, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); identity fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001); and forgery, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999) (statutes in 
Addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether two of defendant's three convictions 
merge either because their statutory elements, as a matter of law, create a greater-lesser 
relationship between the offenses or because, based on the facts specific to this case, the 
convictions all rest upon the same act and, hence, stand in a greater-lesser relationship. 
"Whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,617-18 (Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are particularly relevant to resolution of the issue presented 
on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. .§ 76-6-501 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102 (Supp. 2001) (all in Add. A); and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999) (in Add. C); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999) (in Add. F). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with theft by deception and identity fraud, both second 
degree felonies, and forgery, a third degree felony, based on conduct occurring March 1, 
2001 (R. 2-3). The court appointed counsel for defendant, and, following a preliminary 
hearing, bound defendant over for trial (R. 17,25,27-29, 31-32). The defense at trial was 
one of mistaken identity (R. 173: 10-12,153-68). After the State presented its case-in-
chief, defendant moved for a directed verdict (R. 122-23; R. 173: 98-113). He argued 
that the State had adduced insufficient evidence to support the charges, that the charges 
arose from a single episode and should give rise to a single charge, and that the offenses 
were essentially lesser included ones, again permitting conviction of only a single charge 
2 
for defendant's conduct (R. 173: 98-114). The district court denied the motion in its 
entirety and submitted the case to the jury (R. 173: 107-13, 174-75). The jury convicted 
defendant as charged (R. 115-17). 
Following preparation of a presentence report, the district court judge sentenced 
defendant to the Utah State Prison for one-to-fifteen years on each second degree felony 
and zero-to-five years on the third degree felony, with the time to run concurrent for each 
charge but consecutive to a sentence defendant was to serve in Idaho (R. 121,132-33, 
137-39). Defendant timely appealed (R. 159-60). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Kevin Chukes walked into Crown Bedroom Furniture the morning of 
March 1,2001, and spent a few minutes looking around the store (R. 173: 14, 16,18). He 
then spoke with a salesman, Clark Grimshaw, and ultimately decided to purchase a 
bedroom set (R. 173: 16,18-19,21-23). Defendant explained that he needed the set 
delivered that day, but Grimshaw told him that they did not have the set in stock and 
could not deliver it that day (R. 173: 118,121). Grimshaw then offered to let defendant 
purchase the display model and to disassemble it for him, but that defendant would have 
to make his own arrangements to pick it up (R. 173: 21). Defendant agreed and stated 
that he wanted to finance the purchase (R. 173: 21, 23). 
Defendant filled out a credit application, printing in the boxes provided 
information such as the name, date of birth, social security number, and address of Jeffrey 
Mewborn (R. 173: 24-26; St's Exh. 2). He then signed the name "Jeffrey Mewborn" 
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["JM"] on the application (R. 173: 24-25; St's Exh. 2). Grimshaw explained that there 
would be a few minutes wait while the form was faxed to American General Finance for 
verification and approval or rejection (R. 173: 23-24, 26). Defendant complained of other 
pressing matters and left the store with a promise to call later for the results (R. 173: 26-
27). He had been in the store for a total of approximately half an hour (R. 173: 27). 
Defendant called within the next hour, spoke to Grimshaw, and identified himself 
as Jeffrey Mewborn (R. 173: 29). He was told that the loan had been approved, and that 
he would need to return to sign the sales contract (R. 173: 29-30). Defendant returned to 
the store later that afternoon (R. 173: 31). Grimshaw had the sales contract filled out for 
him, explained the terms of the sale to him, and watched as defendant signed the form 
with the name "Jeffrey Mewborn" (R. 173: 31-33; St's Exh. 1). Defendant also signed 
the name "Jeffrey Mewborn" to the bottom of the sales receipt, which detailed the pieces 
he had bought and reflected a total of $5,955.35 (R. 173: 34-36; St's Exh. 3). Over the 
next half hour, Grimshaw and defendant, with some help from another salesman, loaded 
everything onto a truck defendant had brought with him (R. 173: 39). Defendant left with 
the bedroom set, had no further contact with the store, and made no payments on the 
furniture (R. 173: 38-40,48). 
In early March 2001, Jeffrey Mewborn discovered that someone had his personal 
information and was using it to purchase things in his name (R. 173: 73). He contacted 
several credit bureaus and learned that American General Finance had recently financed a 
purchase (id.). He contacted them to alert them to the situation, and contacted the police 
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(R. 173: 73, 77). He testified that the signatures on the three Crown Bedroom documents 
were his name but not his writing, verified the accuracy of the information included on 
the credit application as being his, denied knowing defendant or ever giving him the 
personal information, and denied ever giving defendant permission to use that 
information, to make the purchase on his behalf, or to sign his name (R. 173: 67-72). 
Two weeks after defendant's purchase, Detective Robin Wilkins showed 
Grimshaw a photo line-up from which Grimshaw immediately chose defendant's 
photograph as the man who represented himself to be Jeffrey Mewbom (R. 173: 40-43, 
47, 64, 80, 84). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that his three convictions should merge into one as a matter of 
law and that the three convictions are necessarily based upon the same act and same 
evidence as the remaining convictions. However, his claims fail upon a comparison of 
the specific elements of the variations of each of the three offenses and of the facts 
established in this case. While Utah law forbids punishing a defendant twice for a single 
act, a defendant may be convicted for offenses arising out of separate acts. Here, the jury 
was able to base defendant's guilt for each offense on a set of facts which required proof 
of at least one additional fact to establish an additional element necessary for conviction 
of the other two offenses. Consequently, defendant fails to establish any greater-lesser 
relationship between the variations of the offenses relevant to this case, and his 
convictions should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF THEFT BY 
DECEPTION, IDENTITY FRAUD, AND FORGERY 
Defendant claims that he committed one crime and should be convicted of a single 
offense. Specifically, he argues that, as a matter of law, forgery is a lesser included 
offense of identity fraud and theft by deception, and that identity fraud is a lesser included 
offense of theft by deception. Br. of Aplt. at 7,10-32. Because he cannot be convicted of 
a greater and a lesser offense, he reasons, the forgery and identity fraud convictions 
necessarily merge into the greater theft by deception conviction. Id. at 7,32. He also 
contends that his convictions for forgery and identity fraud should be vacated because 
these offenses, together with the offense of theft by deception, were based upon the same 
acts established by the same facts at trial. Id. at 32-38. However, contrary to defendant's 
arguments, his convictions do not merge and two should not be vacated because not only 
do the statutory elements of each offense differ such that each of the offenses may be 
committed without necessarily committing the others, but, under the specific variations of 
the offenses proven at trial in this case, his convictions may be based on separate acts. 
A. Trial court's ruling 
Following the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved to have the charges reduced 
to a third degree forgery charge, arguing that the State had "taken one charge, one crime, 
and divided it up into three different categories[,]" that he was being charged three times 
for "the same conduct for the same crime[,]" and that, under State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 
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343,453 P.2d 146 (1969), he was entitled to be charged with the crime carrying the lesser 
degree (R. 173: 98-107). The trial judge heard argument, then denied the motion (ruling 
in Addendum B). The judge noted that he, too, had concerns about the charges, had 
reviewed the statutes and the issue, and had listened to counsel's arguments (R. 173: 107-
08). Add. B. He then ruled that any overlap in the statutes did not encompass the entirety 
of each offense and that each offense had "different and additional elements" which 
prevented them from merging as a matter of law (id.). Add. B. He provided examples of 
those differences, recognized that the evidence reflected those differences, and ruled that 
the Information "appropriately charged [defendant's conduct] as three separate offenses" 
(R. 173: 108-12). Add. B. 
!£• Defendant's claim fails because the offenses include different statutory 
elements established bv different evidence, rendering merger inapplicable 
Merger is required if a defendant is convicted of both a charged offense and a 
lesser included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Addendum C).1 The 
Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-tiered analysis to determine whether two offenses 
1
 Under section 76-1-402(1): 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for 
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; 
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single 
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision.... 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401(1) (1999). Add. C. 
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have the relationship of greater and lesser included offenses. See State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 
611, 618 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,241 (Utah App. 1997); see also 
State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995); State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96,97 (Utah 
1983). "[T]he first step is a purely theoretical comparison of the statutory elements of 
each offense." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97; see also Betha, 957 P.2d at 
618. When examining the elements, if it is found that one (the greater) crime "cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed" the other (lesser) crime, the lesser 
crime merges into the greater crime, and a defendant cannot be convicted for both crimes. 
Betha, 957 P.2d at 619; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. 
Some criminal statutes, however, have multiple variations or elements, so that a 
greater-lesser relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes, but not 
others. Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241; see also Hill, 61A P.2d at 98. In 
such a case, the court must apply a secondary test and look to the evidence presented at 
trial to determine what variation of the crime or crimes was proved and then "look[] to the 
statutory elements of the crime to determine whether it is an included offense." State v. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f 16,994 P.2d 1243; see also Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951 
P.2d at 240. 
Defendant asserts that forgery is a lesser included offense of identity fraud and that 
both these offenses are lesser included offenses of theft by deception as a matter of law. 
Br. of Aplt. at 6-32. Defendant also contends that all of the evidence necessary to 
establish forgery in this case was also necessary to establish identity fraud, and that all the 
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evidence necessary to establish identity fraud was, in turn, necessary to establish the 
deception required for the theft by deception conviction. Id. at 32-38. He argues that 
under the single criminal episode doctrine set forth in section 76-1-402, where the same 
evidence supports multiple convictions, only one of the convictions may be affirmed. Br. 
ofAplt. at 33. 
While the statutory definitions of the charged offenses allow for the commission of 
each offense without necessarily committing either of the other offenses2, there are 
variations of theft by deception and forgery which require consideration of the evidence 
2Each offense requires at least one element not required for the remaining offenses, 
permitting for the commission of each offense without necessarily committing the 
remaining two. For example, when forgery is committed with a signature that "purports 
to be that of a real person, falsity may be shown by evidence that the person whose name 
is signed did not make or authorize the signature." See State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503, 20 
P.2d 614, 617 (1933). No such lack of authority is required in order to establish the 
offense of theft by deception. See State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472,474 (Utah App. 1987) 
(no element of "unauthorized" control is required to establish theft by deception under 
section 76-6-405). Conversely, theft by deception requires the acquisition and exercise of 
control over the property of another, which is not required for a forgery conviction. 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999) and §76-6-501 (1999). Add. A. 
Similarly, forgery requires the use of a "writing," which element is not required for 
an identity fraud conviction. Compare Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 and §76-6-1102 
(Supp. 2001). Add. A. Identity fraud requires the acquisition and use or attempted use of 
personal identifying information of an existent person. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-1102. 
Add. A. These elements are not required for a forgery conviction. See Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-501. Add. A. 
Finally, the acquisition and exercise of control over the property of another which 
is required for theft by deception is not required for identity fraud. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-405 and §76-6-1102. Add. A. Conversely, identity fraud requires proof of a 
lack of authority in the acquisition and use of the personal information. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-1102. Add. A. No similar requirement is necessary for theft by deception. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-405. Add. A. 
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adduced at trial to determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists among the 
offenses proven in this case. See Betha, 957 P.2d at 618; Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. A 
comparison of the evidence reveals that the jury was required to find a fact for each 
offense that was not required for either of the other offenses, defeating defendant's claim 
that a greater-lesser relationship exists between all of the offenses of which defendant was 
convicted in this case. 
L A determination that defendant committed identity fraud on the 
facts at hand did not permit his conviction of forgery without 
additionai evidence and an additional finding 
Under the facts of this case, the conduct establishing identity fraud and forgery 
were not necessarily based on the same act. See State v. Casey, 2001 UT App 205, f 16, 
29 P.3d 25, cert, granted, 32 P.3d 247 (LItah Sep. 26,2001). Acts are independent if they 
are in no way necessary to each other or are sufficiently separated by time and place. See 
id. at f 17 (aggravated assault and attempted murder were not necessary to each other and 
were separated by time, place, and intervening circumstances); see also State v. Young, 
780 P.2d 1233,1239 (Utah 1989) (forcible sexual abuse and forcible sodomy supported 
two counts of aggravated sexual assault because they were in no way necessary to each 
other). In this case, both offenses required a lack of authority by JM, but each was based 
on separate conduct of defendant. 
The jury was instructed on forgery under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(1 )(b) (1999) 
(Add. A), which provides: 
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(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, 
transfers, publishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the 
making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, 
transference, publication or utterance purports to be the act of 
another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to 
have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence 
other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when 
no such original existed. 
(R. 90-94; jury instructions in Addendum D). Additionally, where forgery is established 
with a signature that "purports to be that of a real person, falsity may be shown by 
evidence that the person whose name is signed did not make or authorize the signature." * 
See State v. Jones, 81 Utah 503,20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933) (it is not enough that the proof 
shows that the person whose name was signed did not sign it; proof must also show that 
the name was signed without authority).3 
Identity fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-1102(2) & (3) (Supp. 2001) (Add. A), 
requires that defendant: 
(1) knowingly or intentionally; 
(2) obtain personal identifying information of another person; 
(3) without that person's authorization; and that he 
3Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously included in the forgery jury 
instruction the requirement of lack of authority, among other things. Br. of Aplt. at 11-
12. Not only is the requirement necessary where the forgery is based on the signing of a 
real person's name, Jones, 20 P.2d at 617, but defendant expressly waives any issue as to 
the accuracy of the instructions. Id. at 12. Consequently, the State does not address the 
issue. 
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(4) use, or attempt to use, that information with fraudulent intent, including to 
obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other thing of value in the 
name of the other person without that person's consent; and 
(5) the value of the thing obtained exceeds $5,000.00. 
(Br. of Aplt. at 12; R. 88, jury instruction in Addendum D). 
The prosecutor argued that the personal identifying information included JM's 
name and accurate date of birth, social security number and Stockbridge, Georgia address 
as defendant printed them on the top of the credit card application (R. 173: 140; St's Exh. 
2, attached in Addendum E). That defendant knowingly or intentionally obtained this 
information without JM's consent was established by his placement of the information on 
the credit application and by JM's testimony that he did not know defendant and had 
neither given him the information nor permitted him to use it. His fraudulent intent in 
using or attempting to use the information was established by his statement to the 
salesman that he wanted to purchase the bedroom furniture on credit, following which he 
proceeded to fill out the requisite credit application with JM's name and information. 
The final requirement, defendant's attempt to use the information without JM's consent, 
was complete upon proof that he filled in the top of the credit application with the 
specific, accurate personal identifying information that not only purported to be JM's 
information but in fact was his information, and that JM did not give him permission to 
use the information (St's Exh. 2). Add. E. At this point, all die requisite facts for a 
conviction of identity fraud have been established. 
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However, because anyone could fill in a form with such information without 
necessarily committing a forgery, something else was required before the jury could find 
that defendant committed forgery. The prosecutor argued in opening and closing remarks 
that a forgery in this case occurred each time defendant signed Jeffrey Mewborn's name 
to one of the three documents he executed at Crown Bedrooms (R. 173: 7,141-42). 
Consequently, forgery would arise from defendant's additional act of signing JM's name 
to the written credit application so that the execution "purports to be the act of another[.]" 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501. Defendant thereafter represented himself verbally to be 
Jeffrey Mewbom and signed two more documents with Mewborn's name, committing 
multiple forgeries based on conduct unnecessary to his identity fraud conviction in his 
effort to obtain credit and property in the course of his interaction with Crown Bedroom. 
Consequently, completion of the specific identifying information on the top of the 
form (identity fraud) and forgery of JM's signature at the bottom of the form constitute 
independent acts for which defendant may justifiably be convicted of two offenses. See 
Casey, 2001 UT App 205, ft 18-20. 
2. A finding of theft bv deception did not permit conviction of identity 
fraud or forgery without additional evidence and findings 
Theft by deception requires proof that defendant: 
(1) obtains or exercises control over the property of another 
(2) by deception and 
(3) with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
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See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(1) (1999). Add. A. The second element, "by 
deception," consists of three separate components: "(1) that defendant's acts satisfied the 
statutory definition of deception, (2) that the deception occurred contemporaneously with 
the transaction in question, and (3) that the victim relied upon the deception, at least to 
some extent, in parting with property." See State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Utah 
App.), cert denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).4 
The deception, as defined by statute and explained in the jury instructions, can 
occur when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the 
transaction; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will 
not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue 
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor 
did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
4The fact that the State argues only the "deception" element of the offense of theft 
by deception is not intended as a concession that the remaining elements of the offense 
cannot be distinguished from the elements required for identity fraud or forgery. The 
State addresses the "deception" element alone because it defeats defendant's argument, 
and further discussion of the elements is not warranted. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1999) (in Addendum F); R. 81-82 (jury instructions in 
Addendum D) 
Defendant claims that regardless of which subsection the jury used, they 
necessarily found all the facts necessary to establish the additional crimes of identity 
fraud and forgery, permitting affirmance of only the theft by deception charge. Br. of 
Aplt. at 34-38. However, after finding the requisite deception under any of these four 
subsections, the jury would still be required to find an additional element before it could 
find defendant guilty of the remaining two offenses.5 
Subsection (a): 
Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect 
the judgment of another in the transaction^] 
This is the most likely subsection relied on by the jury inasmuch as the credit 
application contained JM's detailed personal identifying information and was the basis 
upon which defendant was able to obtain both credit and the bedroom furniture. Under 
this subsection of theft by deception and the facts of this case, the jury must find that 
defendant created a false impression knowing it to be false and knowing that the false 
5Although theft by deception and identity fraud are both second degree felonies, 
defendant treats theft by deception as the greater crime for the simple reason that theft by 
deception requires at least one additional element not addressed in the identity fraud 
statute: acquisition and exercise of control over the property. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-405 and § 76-6-1102. Add. A. 
15 
impression would likely affect the judgment of the credit company or the salesman. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(a). Add. F. 
In this case, the jury could have found that defendant committed theft by deception 
under this subsection by taking into account all the facts proven at trial except the fact of 
authority necessary for the additional two offenses: lack of authority to obtain and use the 
personal information (identity fraud) and lack of authority to sign JM's name (forgery). 
That defendant obtained and exercised control over property of another is undisputed: he 
obtained and used more than $5,000 worth of credit, and he left the store at the end of the 
day with the bedroom set. The deception under subsection (a) arises from defendant's 
words and conduct surrounding the transaction. He comes in, chooses furniture, 
expresses a desire to purchase it himself on credit, completes the credit application with 
information that is not his own, signs the credit application-and two additional documents 
necessary to obtain the furniture-with a name that is not his own, represents himself to be 
that person when he calls the store to check the status of the credit application, and in all 
relevant ways acts to convince the salesman and the credit company that he is JM. There 
is no evidence that he believed himself to be JM, and JM himself testified as to his own 
identity. 
Even assuming that defendant had authority to sign JM's name, which is not a fact 
before this jury, the judgment of at least the credit company is likely to have been 
affected by defendant's misrepresentation of himself as being JM because the company 
would, in all likelihood, have sought verification of the claimed authority-something 
16 
unnecessary under the facts of this case. Regardless of the existence of authority, 
defendant's representation of himself as being JM created the deception required under 
subsection (a) and led both the credit company and the salesman to make their decision to 
provide him with credit and/or furniture based on that deception. Moreover, the requisite 
intent to deprive is established by the fact of defendant's representation of himself as 
being JM together with the fact that payment was not thereafter made on the bedroom 
furniture. 
Consequently, the jury could find defendant guilty of theft by deception and still 
require additional evidence to establish the lack of authority required for each of the 
additional offenses of identity fraud and forgery. 
Subsection (b): 
Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true[.] 
Deception under this subsection would be established by the proof required for 
subsection (a) and the fact that at no time did defendant ever attempt to correct the false 
impression he created that he was JM, despite ample opportunity to do so. Nothing 
required to establish the requisite deception under this subsection alleviates the need for 
the additional findings of lack of authority required for a conviction of identity fraud and 
forgery. 
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Subsection (c): 
Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in 
the transaction^] 
This subsection may be established by means of the credit application or by all of 
the evidence outlined above for subsection (a). Defendant's use on the credit application 
of JM's name and accurate identifying information prevented the salesman and the credit 
company from suspecting that further inquiry was warranted and gave them no 
opportunity to discover the information they truly sought: defendant's own identity and 
credit information. The remainder of the deception established in subsection (a) is 
relevant here as well because the totality of defendant's conduct and representations 
throughout the transaction prevented the credit company and the salesman from 
suspecting at any time that defendant was not really JM and from determining that they 
did not have the information they believed they had-defendant's own information-upon 
which to base their decision to give him credit and the bedroom furniture. The relevance 
of this information to the decision of both the credit company and the salesman is 
undeniable. 
Even if defendant had authority to obtain and/or use JM's signature and 
information, his failure to disclose it would still amount to a deception under this 
subsection because his charade as to his identity led the salesman and the credit company 
to believe something that was not true and to give credit and furniture to defendant based 
on that false belief 
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Accordingly, the question of defendant's authority either to obtain or to use JM's 
signature and personal information is irrelevant to establishment of a deception under this 
subsection, and the jury must find that authority based on additional evidence before it 
could convict defendant of identity fraud and forgery. 
Subsection (e): 
Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the 
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise 
would not be performed. 
The deception under this subsection necessarily arises from the sales contract 
inasmuch as the contract purported to bind defendant as "JM" to make future payments 
for the furniture, which payments he did not intend to make. This was the only 
performance defendant promised to make. His signing of the sales contract undeniably 
affected the judgment of the credit company and the salesman inasmuch as the contract 
contained all the terms, rights, and conditions relative to the sale and release of the 
furniture. Defendant's lack of intent to perform on the promise to pay rests on his 
charade of being JM and his use of JM's name on the sales contract without revealing that 
he was not, in fact, JM, together with his failure thereafter to make any payments. The 
jury need not find that defendant knew the promise would not be performed by JM so 
long as they find that defendant, himself, did not intend to perform it. See Utah Code 
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Ann. § 76-6-40 l(5)(e) ( " . . . which performance the actor does not intend to perform or 
knows will not be performed ...") (emphasis added). Add. F. 
Consequently, defendant's authority, or lack thereof, to possess JM's information 
and to sign his name has no bearing on the jury's ability to convict defendant of theft by 
deception based on the deception in subsection (e). The three convictions, therefore, do 
not rest on the same facts, and defendant's claim to the contrary fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
This case does not present a novel or important issue. Consequently, the State 
does not ask that the matter be set for oral airgument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _0 day of January, 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 8B 
1999 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 76 and 77 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
PARTS 
FRAUD 
76-6-601. Forgery —Writing" defined. 
( D A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing9 includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. IMS, 76-6-466, enacted by L. 
1*71, ch. 196, I 76-6-466. 
History: C. 1963, 76-6-601, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 196, I 7641401; 1974, eh. 32 ,1 19; 
1975, ch. 69, I 1; 1996, ch. 291, I 16; 1996, 
eh. 206,1 27. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1996, incorporated 
former Subsection (3), which had set out the 
elements of second degree forgery, into Subsec-
tion (2); deleted "with a face amount of $100 or 
more* after "a check" in Subsection (2Xc); de-
leted "if the writing is or purports to be a check 
with a face amount of less than $100; all other 
forgery is a class A misdemeanor" from the end 
of Subsection (3); and made minor stylistic 
changes throughout the section 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, in Subsection (2) added "electronic stor-
age or transmission" and substituted "valuable 
information including forms such as" for "infor-
mation," making related stylistic changes. 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
2001 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
19M EDITION 
7041.1102. Identity fraud crime. 
(1) For purposes of this part, "personal identifying information" may in-
clude: 
(a) name; 
(b) address; 
(c) telephone number; 
(d) driver's license number; 
(e) Social Security number; 
(f) place of employment; 
(g) employee identification numbers or other personal identification 
numbers; 
(h) mother's maiden name; 
(i) electronic identification numbers; 
(j) digital signatures or a private key; or 
(k) any other numbers or information that can be used to access a 
person's financial resources or medical information in the name of another 
person without the consent of that person except for numbers or informa-
tion that can be prosecuted as financial transaction card offenses under 
Sections 76-6-606 through 76-6-506.4. 
(2) A person is guilty of identity fraud when that person knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) obtains personal identifying information of another person without 
the authorization of that person; and 
(b) uses, or attempts to use, that information with fraudulent intent, 
including to obtain, or attempt to obtain, credit, goods, services, any other 
thing of value, or medical information in the name of another person 
without the consent of that person. 
(3) Identity fraud is: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor if: 
(i) a value cannot be determined and the personal identifying 
information has been used to obtain medical information in the name 
of another person without the consent of that person; or 
(ii) the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other thing of 
value is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or any 
other thing of value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $6,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony if the value of the credit, goods, services, or 
any other thing of value is or exceeds $6,000. 
(4) Multiple violations within a 90-day period may be aggregated into a 
single offense, and the degree of the offense is determined by the total value of 
all credit, goods, services, or any other thing of value used, or attempted to be 
used, through the multiple violations. 
History: C. IMS, 76-6-110X, enacted by L. came effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to 
9000, ch. 67, f 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 67 be-
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1 attempted theft by deception as well, because I think that's 
2 part of the crime of forgery, 
3 I've never gotten this far in a case that way, I've 
4 just pled it out or pled to one count or another, and sometimes 
5 it's been to my client's advantage to plead to the misdemeanor, 
6 theft by deception, than to take a felony count. 
7 But I don't think that because the State always 
8 charges it that way that makes it correct. I think it's always 
9 been wrong (inaudible). I think theft by deception is part of 
10 the crime of forgery because part of forgery is again, to try 
11 I to fraud somebody, and part of fraud is to try to get something 
12 I of value from somebody else. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. This motion, on the other 
14 hand, is not surprising. I have the same type of concerns, and 
15 as I reviewed the Information before — in my preparation for 
16 this jury trial today, and I spent a great deal of time reading 
17 each of the statutes. I spent a great deal of time drawing 
18 pictures of them and going back to my second grade diagraming 
19 I of sentences and seeing what modifies what, and what applies to 
20 what. And I also determined at that time that I was going to 
21 rely a great deal on what the attorneys argued before me today, 
22 because I didn't get all of my questions answered with my own 
23 research and my own pictures. 
24 But I have had an opportunity to review it and I've 
25 now had an opportunity to listen to the arguments that have 
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1 been made vei well by both sides. I am ruling that the three 
2 counts in the Information are appropriately charged as three 
3 separate offenses, and that they can go to a trier of fact on 
4 those — all three charges. 
5 I do not find that their overlap is so great that 
6 there cannot be the different charges charged. The reason I'm 
7 doing that is because I do find different and additional 
8 elements in each of the offenses, which I think is what is 
9 necessary in order to overcome any Shaundell problems. And 
10 those different elements need to be there. 
11 I It is true that Mr. O'Connell argues that the evidence 
12 that we use in trying to show — that the State uses in trying 
13 to show a theft by deception may very well be forgery-type of 
14 conduct, or — and it may even be that the type of evidence 
15 that the State tries to use in showing the fraud element of a 
16 theft by deception or the identity fraud is the forgery. 
17 But as I go through each one of these charges, there 
18 I is separate elements that is required for each one. In the 
19 theft by deception, that they actually obtain or exercise 
20 control over the property of someone by this deception. And 
21 while the evidence of the identity fraud and the forgery is 
22 part of the evidence with the deception, there is still the 
23 additional element of obtaining and exercising control over the 
24 property of Crown Furniture, in this case — Crown Bedrooms. 
25 And also, the finance company, the evidence has been presented 
-109-
1 to the jury that it is — that using that fraudulent 
2 information to try to obtain the property belonging to those 
3 victims separate and independent from what is being required in 
4 the identity fraud. 
5 In the identity fraud it does actually require that 
6 they obtain personal identifying information of another, and I 
7 am persuaded by the State's argument that that is in addition 
8 to the signing of a name. 
9 A forgery can be a forgery if there is fraud, even if 
10 it's not a real name, just a made-up name is a fraudulent 
11 intent. But the thing that makes a identity crime different 
12 from the forgery is that they are obtaining identifying 
13 personal information, and I think that that — it requires more 
14 than just simply a name. 
15 And in this case evidence has been presented that the 
16 date of birth and Social Security number and the information 
17 that — the attempt to use this or the use of this information 
18 with fraudulent intent, including to get credit, is where it 
19 differs the identity fraud from the theft by deception, in that 
20 they are actually trying to exercise control over the property 
21 I of Mr. Mewborn in this case. 
22 His credit rating, he had to go back and close every 
23 credit card. His credit rating has been greatly affected, and 
24 I so there really is yet another victim and other property, which 
25 is specifically stated in the identity crime, that — for using 
-110-
1 it to obtain credit is one of the goods, services, other areas 
2 as well, in addition to the property of Crown Bedrooms or 
3 American General Finance. 
4 So that separates those two crimes, and then, as I 
5 have stated earlier, that that is an additional element to the 
6 forgery, which could be something as simple as signing a name 
7 that doesn't even exist, if it's with the intent to have fraud. 
8 So while all of the elements overlap and while the 
9 evidence that is being presented to show that does overlap to a 
10 certain extent, I find that there has been different elements 
11 shown and argued in each one of the counts, and in fact, that 
12 the evidence towards all of those elements have been presented 
13 I by the State's witnesses at this time. 
14 I don't know, Mr. O'Connell, if you actually made your 
15 motion about the prima facia case, or you just said you wanted 
16 to. 
17 MR. O'CONNELL: I did. It was sort of at the 
18 beginning. 
19 THE COURT: And we didn't argue it, if you wanted to. 
20 I MR. O'CONNELL: One response, though. My 
21 understanding on what your ruling is that theft by deception 
22 has an additional element that forgery doesn't have, and that's 
23 that they gain property. If that's the case, then forgery is a 
24 lesser included of the theft by deception. If you have all the 
25 same elements of the short one, you're a lesser included 
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1 offense, and so that's where it be the lesser included. So 
2 it's again it's — it could be (inaudible) either/or but not 
3 the same thing. 
4 Then you talked about identity fraud and you 
5 distinguished identity fraud because forgery can also have a 
6 situation where there's a fictional person. Again, that sounds 
7 like there is an additional element that's in forgery that is 
8 not in identity fraud, because a forgery can involve using the 
9 identity of somebody else, but it's also an additional element. 
10 If that's the case then identity fraud is a lesser included 
11 offense of forgery. 
12 I I know they're different degrees, but I think when you 
13 look at whether or not it's a lesser included, it's whether or 
14 not you have all the same elements but in short form. So it 
15 sounds like identity fraud has all the same elements that 
16 forgery has, but forgery can be — also have a fictional 
17 person, so we can take it one step farther. 
18 I So again, I think there should be only one count. In 
19 this case if they are a lesser included of each other, I guess 
20 I it would be one count of theft by deception plus two counts of 
21 a lesser included. 
22 THE COURT: And if the lesser included didn't also 
23 involve the actual uttering or signing, then I might bite off 
24 on that argument, but the additional element is forgery and 
25 it's the actual uttering or signing of the other name — of the 
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1 (inaudible) purporting it to be the act of another. 
2 So I — my ruling is that there are separate elements 
3 and that they are — I certainly think that the record is clear 
4 on what your argument has been, Mr. O'Connell, and I don't 
5 think that — but if you want the benefit of the record to put 
6 any more of that on, you certainly may. But— 
7 MR. O'CONNELL: I do, your Honor. I guess I'm a 
8 little unclear because the uttering is pretty broad. In fact, 
9 forgery is a little broad,. You're actually not signing 
10 I anything to commit forgery. 
11 THE COURT: That's right. 
12 I MR. O'CONNELL: You pretty much can do anything to 
13 commit a forgery as long as you're doing it with the purpose to 
14 fraud in the act of another, and I don't see how you can have 
15 identity fraud without uttering, signing, executing, all of the 
16 many things you have in forgery. I think it's impossible. And 
17 I so I don't think that would be an additional element. I don't 
18 think you can commit identity fraud--
19 THE COURT: And the record reflects that. 
20 MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, also I do want to say that 
21 the State hasn't made a prima facia case in this case and I 
22 would ask for a directed verdict at this point. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further than what's 
24 been argued, Ms. Onton? 
25 MS. ONTON: We'll submit it, your Honor. 
Addendum C 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 8B 
1999 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 76 and 77 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
( D A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1963, 76-1-40* enacted by L. 
1973, cb. 196,1 76-1-401; 1974, eh. 31 ,1 1. 
Addendum D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
of the offense of Theft by Deception as charged in Count I of 
the Information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over 
the property of CROWN tilih I ill L1,113 and/or AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE; 
and 
2. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property by deception; and 
3. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. That the value of the property was or exceeded 
$5,000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Theft by Deception as charged 
in Count I of the Information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of Count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. g 
"Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a 
transfer of possession or of some other legally recognized 
interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another. 
"Property" means anything of value, including tangible 
personal property and includes money. 
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious objectifcto 
withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to 
use under circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be 
lost, or to restore the property only upon payment of a reward 
or other compensation, or to dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will recover 
it. 
"Deception" occurs when a person intentionally 
a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression 
of law or fact that is false and that the actor does not believe 
to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction; or 
b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact 
that is false and that the actor previously created or confirmed 
by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or 
c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to 
affect his judgment in the transaction; or 
d) Promises performance that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction, which performance the 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Page 2 
actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed; 
provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue 
without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not sufficient 
proof that the actor did not intent! to perform or knew the 
promise would not be performed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /3 
A person commits Identity Fraud when he knowingly or 
intentionally obtains personal identifying information of 
another person without the authorization of that person and uses 
or attempts to use that information with fraudulent intent, 
including to obtain or attempt to obtain credit, goods, 
services, any other thing of value or medical information in the 
name of another person without the consent of that person. 
INSTRUCTION NO /^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
of the crime of Identity Fraud, as charged in Count II of the 
Information, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
as a party to the offense, 
2. knowingly or intentionally obtained personal 
identifying information of Jeffrey Mewborn without the 
authorization of Jeffrey Mewborn; and 
3. used or attempted to use that information with 
fraudulent intent, including to obtain or attempt to obtain, 
credit, goods, services, any other thing of value, or medical 
information in the name of Jeffrey Mewborn without the consent 
of Jeffrey Mewborn; and 
4. the value of the credit, goods, services, or any other 
thing of value is or exceeds $5,000.00 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Identity Fraud as charged in 
Count II of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of Count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I? 
To act with "intent to defraud" or "fraudulent intent" 
means to act willfully, and with the specific intent to deceive 
or cheat, ordinarily for the purpose of either causing some 
financial loss to another, or bringing about some financial gain 
to oneself. 
INSTRUCTION NO. /Q, 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of 
Forgery if that person makes, completes, executes, 
authenticates, transfers, publishes or otherwise utters any 
writing so that the writing or the utterance purports to be the 
act of another, and he does so with the purpose to defraud 
anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be 
perpetrated by anyone. 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 7 
Before you can convict the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
of the offense of Forgery as charged in Count III of the 
Information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of March, 2001, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, KEVIN MAURICE CHUKES, 
intentionally or knowingly made, executed, issued or uttered a 
writing; and 
2. That said writing or utterance purported to be the act 
of JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and 
3. That said writing or utterance was not the act of 
JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and 
4. That said writing or utterance was not authorized by 
JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and 
5. That the said defendant then and there knew the 
writing was not the act of JEFFREY G. MEWBORN and was not 
authorized by JEFFREY G. MEWBORN; and 
6. That the said defendant then and there had a purpose 
to defraud. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Forgery as charged in Count 
III of the Information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty 
of Count III. 
a-\ 
INSTRUCTION NO. /% 
"Make" means to cause to exist or to form, fashion or 
produce. 
"Execute" means to make or to do. 
"Issue" means to send forth, to emit; to promulgate; to put 
into circulation; or to send out or go forth as authoritative or 
binding. 
"Utter" means to offer. 
"Writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable 
information including such forms as (a) checks, tokens, stamps, 
seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any other 
symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; (b) a 
security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing 
issued by a government or any agency; or (c) a check, an issue 
of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a 
pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
A "purpose to defraud" is an intent to deceive another for 
the purpose of gaining some material advantage over him or to 
induce him to part with property, and to accomplish that purpose 
by some false statement, false pretense, or by any other 
artifice or act designed to deceive. 
"Facilitating a fraud" means to make easier or less 
difficult a false statement, false pretense or any deceitful 
practice which is intended to deceive another for the purpose of 
gaining some material advantage over him or to induce him to 
oart with property. 
"Perpetrate" means to commit or to do. 
"Purport" means to have the appearance of being. 
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Kb I AIL U K b U m A P K L l U A N U N 
Credit Applied For: ; Joint ^"individual 
(A married applicant may apply for an individual account.; 
AMERICAN 
GENERAL 
F I N A N C E 
*PLICANT: For an individual account, please complete this section and sign in Section 3. (Please Print) 
lame First Name Ml Suffix Date of Birth 
Date: 
nriK/ KlumKAr ' 
ne Phone 
lT\ierWelrhf 
#Dep. E-mail AddW 
tESENT ADDRESS (Street Address or P.O. Box Number) 
DEVIOUS ADDRESS (tf less than 3 yrs at present) 
Social Security Nu ber 
Driver's License # 
City 
Vl7lTloi Ife) <>U -h \Mk\t 
State Zip Code 
Mlfll I jfll+fr^klf lei |rf|7T 5T Mos 
RESENT EMPLOYER (Name of Company) 
City 
tie/Position 
]M 
income * 
City 
State Zip Code 
Wl3oftjfi/ 
State; 
EH 
>! f |V\ ig ir |^! ( HM 
ther Income 
rrr sl^tolfiioiq 
• Gross • Monthly 
• Net [ j Annual 
Source 
• Gross Q Monjhry 
• • 
Employer Phone 
rszr (SjsiB.Ka 
# Bank Cards 
limony, Child Support or Separate Maintenance Income Need Not Be Disclosed Unless Relied Upon For Credit.) 
DEVIOUS EMPLOYER (if less than 3 yrs. at present) Personal Reference (Not Irving with you) 
— ] j | 1 1 I ! 1 ! 1 ! 1 1 1 ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1 1 1 1 
Mos.i 
Type of Bank Account 
• Checking • Savings 
• Renting MoJ^flMg.Pmt Buyjng 
Own $ x 
Mtg. Balance Value of Home Reference Phone 
W\U\Mo\c\ (\fW])mW\-\W7u 
MNT APPLICANT: Complete this section only if this is a joint application and joint applicant will be contractually liable for repayment or if 
cant is relying on another party's income. Joint applicant must sign in Section 3. 
ame First Name Ml Suffix Date of Birth Social Security Number 
I on. i/cn/i 
resent address is the same as above, check here: • Relationship to Applicant: Q Spouse • Non-spouse 
IESENT ADDRESS (Street Address or P.O. Box Number) City 
Home Phone 
State Zip Code 
J L 
I k* 
IESENT E 
I Mos. 
. 
I 
I 
l 
I i 
MPLOYER (Name of Company) 
_ ] _ I I I I i 
I I I | | 
City 
I I I 
State 
tie/Position 
i I. 
i i i i 
Income 
her Income 
• Gross • Monthly 
• Net • Annual 
Source 
Q Gross • Monthly , 
• Net • Annual ( 
Employer Phone 
imony, Child Support or Separate Maintenance Income Need Not Be Disclosed Unless Relied Upon For Credit.) 
PLICANT/JOINT APPLICANT:Please read and sign below. 
»r will submit your application to American General Finance, Inc. (AGF), P.O. Bex 59, Evansville, IN 47701, or its affiliate, which may buy your Retail Installment Sales Contract 
may share with its affiliates any information regarding you or your application, acceptance, or credit experience with AGF. However, you may request that this information not be shared with affiliates 
otifying AGF by mail or phone at the location shown above or by initialing this box: I I 1 I Please DO NOT share information about me with your affiliates. 
may investigate your creditworthiness (including obtaining credit reports and verifying employment information) AGF may request a consumer report from consumer reporting agencies in considering 
credit application AGF may use any credit report obtained in connection with this application for future credit offers. 
)M TIME TO TIME, AGF WILL NOTIFY YOU WHEN ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES ARE AVAILABLE, BY TELEPHONE AND/OR MAIL, AND THAT SUCH SERVICES MAY INCLUDE 
30TIABLE CHECKS WHICH YOU MAY ENDORSE TO OBTAIN A LOAN, OR DESTROY IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO ACCEPT THE LOAN OFFER. IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO RECEIVE THESE 
JCITATIONS, PLEASE STRIKE AND INITIAL THIS PARAGRAPH. 
N YORK, OHIO, AND WISCONSIN RESIDENTS: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION. 
-IANT USE ONLY 
Seller's Fax Tot. Purchase Dwn. Pmt. Amount Trade-in 
W})\M£-mij3£ $! I ' / y ^ i W $i 
Net Balance 
Seller's Name 
/7s?^^J /z 
Seller's Merchandise 
r 
?ZJC7YZ*V< v v O , -
NOTICE TO NEW YORK RESIDENTS 
Upon your request, we will inform you whether or not we requested a consumer report on you and the name and 
address of the consumer reporting agencies that furnished such reports. 
NOTICE TO OHIO RESIDENTS: 
The Ohio laws against discrimination require that all creditors make credit equally available to all credit worthy cus-
tomers, and that credit reporting agencies maintain separate credit histones on each individual upon request The 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission administers compliance with this law. 
NOTICE OF WISCONSIN RESIDENTS: 
No provision of any marital property agreement, a unilateral statement under §766.59 Wis. Stats, or a court decree 
under §766.70 Wis. Stats, adversely affects the interest of the creditor unless the creditor, prior to the time the 
credit is granted or an open-end credit plan is entered into, is furnished a copy of the agreement, statement or 
decree or has actual knowledge of the adverse provision when the obligation to the creditor is incurred. 
In addition, if I have applied for individual credit and I am married, I must send you the name and address of my 
spouse within 15 days so that you can provide my spouse with the disclosure required under Wisconsin law. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 
EXHIBfTMO ^ -
CASE NO 
DATERECD 
IN EVIDENCE 
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Titles 76 and 77 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, 
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights 
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise contain-
ing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature 
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical 
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the 
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or 
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) lb restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now believe 
to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without 
disclosing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal 
impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not 
a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
History: C. IMS, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1973, eh. 196, t 76-6-401. 
